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Multicast on IP-protokollateknologia, jonka avulla verkon kapasiteetin käyttöä voidaan
optimoida ryhmäsovellusten tarpeisiin. Multicast asettaa turvallisuusteknologiaan
liittyvien avainten hallinnalle uusia haasteita. Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan
multicast verkkojen turvallisuusavainten hallintaan tarvittavia mekanismeja.
Esittelemme muutamia olemassa olevia avaintenhallintajärjestelmiä ja vertailemme
niiden ominaisuuksia.
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Multicasting is an IP protocol technology that can be used to optimise network usage in
group communication applications such as videoconferencing. Multicasting sets special
requirements for security key management. In this study we take a look at the proposed
multicast key management schemes and compare their properties.
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11. Introduction
Group communication services, like news, chat, videoconferencing or online
gaming and simulation services, are becoming more popular these days. Also pay-TV
and video on-demand type entertainment services are envisioned to become a part of
the networked world. The need for security in these environments is very important
especially for the service provider and in many applications for the end user, too. The
communication occurs most often in Internet type public network. The most important
aspects of security in those types of network are that the messaging between group
members cannot be eavesdropped and that all the communication between members can
be authenticated and integrity checked. These properties are not equally essential in
every kind of group application but their need is dependent on the type of trust
relationship between communicating parties. For example a pay-TV service provider
wants to be sure that that program transmissions are viewed by the valid, paying
customers only.
It is very common to make use of a technique called multicasting in the context of
group communication over an Internet Protocol (IP) based network. With multicast we
are able to save network bandwidth and server capacity by sending some information
only once to several recipients at a time. From the security point of view providing an
efficient security key management system for possibly a very large multicast group is
very challenging as the group members can represent varying degrees of
trustworthiness. In this study we will examine various multicast group key management
schemes and compare their strengths and weaknesses.
This study is divided into following chapters. In Chapter 2 we introduce IP
multicasting and its routing protocols. Then in Chapter 3 we present security concepts
needed in multicast key management. In Chapter 4 we present multicast group
characteristics and inspect what kind of security issues are related to them. In Chapter 5
we gather a few most well-known key distribution mechanisms and compare their
properties. In Chapter 6 we draw conclusions and take a look at the futures of multicast
key management.
1.1 Context of the study
To bring the security concepts closer to our world we use an imaginary test bed
company whose business relies totally on different kind of multicasting services. The
company is called KeyTouch communications and the services it provides can be seen
in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. KeyTouch communications services
Keytouch offers services in such a way that every type of multicast communication
is used. Pay TV service applies one-to-many communication and secure conferencing
applies many-to-many communication whereas information delivery and polling
services create both one-to-many and many-to-one communication. All of these
services have different bandwidth and delivery delay requirements. Every type of these
multicasting communications has also bit different security requirements. [Taxonomy,
1999].
Keytouch is used as an example environment for multicast applications throughout
this study so that we really see what kind of implications all the different requirements
set to security arrangements.
2. IP Multicasting
Traditional radio transmissions have been with us almost a hundred years and
television has entertained us several decades. This idea of broadcasting radio waves
through the air (see Figure 2) and cables has truly been used extensively around the
world and there is no end to this in the horizon either. Sending information from one
point to almost infinite number of receiving apparatus has really revolutionalised
society's information delivery mechanism and even our way of life. On the other hand
our most natural way of communication - speech - makes use of the same principle.
Communication between humans with common language is very straightforward and
3transition from human to human and human to group communication is very
transparent to us.
Figure 2. Radio wave broadcasting
When it comes to Internet the traffic has traditionally been only one-to-one or
unicast communication, in a sense that the network packets have had only one
destination address. There hasn't really been need for other kind of datagrams: people
have only connected to remote machines to check their e-mail, transfer files, or view
web pages. But this is about to change. At the moment we are witnessing a huge
exponential growth of the number of Internet users. These new users are using web
services like never before. Static web pages with static pictures and looping sound
samples have satisfied people's surfing hunger for a few years now but the services are
becoming richer every day. All kinds of streaming media formats, chat communities
and gaming services are becoming commonplace. This kind of rich content requires
more processor power on the server side and network bandwidth than static content. In
practice this means that a popular streaming media server will become a bottleneck, as
it can't serve all users adequately when everyone requires separate network packets for
same information. This way the capacity of even a clustered server is consumed very
quickly.
Another extreme compared to one-to-one unicasting connections is broadcasting.
Broadcasting lowers the burden of the server and network tremendously by forming IP
network address space based broadcast groups and by sending each datagram only once
to this group. This is impractical if we don't want everyone in the same network to
receive all the datagrams sent to broadcast group. Things become extremely
complicated when we want to route these packets to other networks and still use
broadcast. Something else had to be brought up.
In 1985 Steve Deering from University of Stanford developed the idea of
multicasting. He came up with a thought that video and audio transmissions could be
4sent to a single IP address but still the datagrams would flow to several recipients. This
kind of approach meant huge amounts of network bandwidth and server load savings.
And already in 1989 Steve Deering had authored RFC1112, the document defining
multicast extensions for IP version 4.
As multicasting is an extension to IPv4 standard, it hasn't been extensively used yet
because craving for on-demand and group conferencing type services hasn't been very
large. Most of the routers in Internet today are simple unicast routers. Newer routers
support multicasting so the technology is spreading.
Multicasting requires that all the routers and hosts along the route from sending
host to receiving multicast group member support multicasting. With special
arrangements we can use IP tunnelling through networks without multicast support to
deliver services between multicast islands but this technique is not very commonly
used. Nevertheless, this kind of approach is used in experimental multicast network
MBONE.
keytouch.com
Broadcast
Unicast
Multicast
Anycast
Figure 3. Delivery methods
The implementation of multicasting is mandatory in IP version 6. This means that
every router, switch and host supporting IPv6 must also support multicasting. The
standardisers have evidently acknowledged that multicast usage will become more
popular in the future.
IP version 6 brings also a new type of address called anycast. Anycast addresses can
be utilized, for example, when several hosts provide the same service. These hosts share
the same anycast address. The user doesn't have to know which host provides the best
service as the anycast mechanism decides the most suitable server based on some
metrics, for example response time.
52.1 Types of multicasting
There are three types of multicast communication: one-to-many, many-to-many and
many-to-one. In every type of communication the idea is the same: The sender directs
all datagrams to a single IP address once and the datagrams are delivered to every
member of the multicast group.
In one-to-many communication there exists only one sender and zero or more hosts
that are listening to the senders datagrams. This is natural way for all types of on-
demand and file distribution services. Keytouch communications uses one-to-many
delivery to telecast movies and all kinds of TV material.
Many-to-many multicast communication occurs usually when we are dealing with
group communication. In Keytouch context this means video conferencing and other
conferencing services too. More specifically these might include online gaming and
online mentoring systems.
Many-to-one type of communication is very useful when we are providing high
availability resource discovery and data collection services to a large amount users.
Keytouch.com provides auctioning service to make use of this kind of communication.
Multicasting is achieved with special routers, which keep track of all the networks
within its rooting domain that contain multicast/host group members. The routers do
not have to keep track of all the members of multicast group. They just need to know
the networks towards which they should copy the multicast datagrams. In principle, the
sender doesn't have to keep track of all the recipients either. But when we keep in mind
the nature of most multicasting services, in practice there has to be some entity on
behalf of service provider that registers all the receiving parties. And this is essentially
the case from the security point of view too.
2.2 Group Management
Multicasting provides very dynamic framework for managing group members.
Members can join and leave groups at any time with the help of Internet group
management protocol (IGMP) [RFC 1112, 1989]. A group can contain any number of
member hosts. Also, there is no restriction on the number of groups that a host can
belong to. IGMP operates only at LAN level between group hosts and closest LAN
routers.
In IPv4 IGMP is an extension to Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
[RFC792, 1981], which in turn is part of IP protocol. In IPv6 IGMP is an integral part
of ICMPv6 [RFC 1885, 1995], as all hosts have to support multicasting [IBM TCP/IP
RedBook, 1998].
IGMP is an asymmetric protocol meaning that member hosts are the only ones
sending IGMP messages. They communicate with the closest multicast router with join
6or leave group messages. The task of the router is then to forward the host’s will
upstream towards the multicast source or rendezvous point using multicast routing
protocols. [RFC792, 1981]
IGMP in its simplicity doesn’t provide any means for authenticating hosts or users
when they are requesting or quitting the membership of a group. For services like our
imaginative KeyTouch.com the authentication of service users is extremely important.
So to make multicast services viable for providers and secure for users we need
additional services and protocols. We will examine group management security issues
in Chapter 4.
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2.3 Routing
In this chapter we take a look at the available IPv4 routing algorithms and the
techniques they are using for packet delivery. This information serves as background
knowledge for upcoming multicast security issues.
Most multicast routing protocols use optimal path, loop-free topologies to deliver
packets to group members. In fact, routers form spanning trees, which have exactly one
connection between each pair of networks (LANs). Routing protocols use different
techniques to construct these spanning trees.
Several propositions have aroused considering how to handle multicast routing. In
addition to technical differences in propositions, main difference between protocols has
been to consider how the group members are expected to be distributed within the
network and how the spanning tree is constructed.
Figure 4. Division of labour between multicast protocols
7One approach is to assume that member hosts are densely distributed throughout the
network. These dense area algorithms rely on the facts that every sub-network contains
at least one member host and that there is lots of network bandwidth available.
Dense area protocols are usually interior gateway protocols meaning that they are
intended to operate inside an organization’s network. Dense area protocols use a
technique called flooding. This means that routers send multicast packets through every
network interface they have as packets move through network and packets are delivered
to every densely placed members and the spanning tree is formed.
The most well known dense-mode routing protocols are Distance Vector Multicast
Routing Protocol (DVMRP) [RFC 1075, 1988], Multicast Open Shortest Path First
(MOSPF) [RFC 1583, 1994] [RFC 1584, 1994] and Protocol Independent Multicast –
Dense Mode (PIM-DM) [RFC 2362, 1998].
We say that the member hosts are located in a sparse area, if the member hosts are
not necessarily located in every subnet and network bandwidth is very limited in some
parts of the network. In that type of environment flooding would waste network
bandwidth so we need other techniques for forming the spanning tree. Algorithms for
sparse areas do not voluntarily send packets to every downstream interface but they
need explicit requests for forwarding packets to some interface.
Sparse area algorithms present a new breed of algorithms. Internet community has
come to an understanding that flooding algorithms do not scale well to large-scale
applications so something else has been brought up to make multicasting really viable.
The most well-known sparse area routing algorithms are Core Based Trees (CBT) and
Protocol Independent Multicast – Sparse Mode (PIM-SM).
IPv6 brings a number of beneficial features including network level security and
quality of service (QoS). Along with these enhancements both unicast and multicast
routing become more complex. To accommodate the challenges the research
community has started several projects to develop QoS-aware multicast routing
protocols. In addition to QoS-aware dense and sparse area protocols some new
protocols include adaptive characteristics that enable the building of spanning trees for
both densely or sparsely distributed groups.
In the next section we are going to take a brief look at the basic operation and
architecture principles of the algorithms in both categories.
2.3.1 Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol (DVMRP)
DVMRP is the oldest published multicast routing protocol and its version one dates
back to 1988. Since then the protocol has been revised and current version 3 is available
as an Internet draft. As stated before it is a dense-mode protocol and is designed to
8work within an autonomous system so it does not scale well to large Internet wide
applications. [RFC 1075, 1988] It is only able to support spanning trees that are less
than 32 levels deep.
Although DVMRP is an old protocol it is very efficient distributed protocol for
connection-less multicast packet delivery. In addition to that it has a feature that has
helped this protocol to become so popular: DVMRP is able to encapsulate multicast
packets into normal unicast packets, which has made it possible to route multicast
packets over unicast networks. This has been very useful, as IPv4 does not natively
support multicast so most of the routers in the Internet have been without multicast
support. The multicast prototype network MBONE has made a lot of use of this feature.
DVMRP is based on the Routing Information Protocol (RIP), which is a unicast
routing protocol that has been in use since the early days of Arpanet [RFC 1058, 1988].
Both of these algorithms use the results of the Bellman-Ford single-source shortest-path
algorithm [Cormen et al., 1990]. DVMRP supports only the number of hops as the
routing metric mechanism, which restricts its configurability.
Operation overview
DVRMP uses a “broadcast & prune” technique to build its minimum spanning tree.
This means that the multicast routers build a separate spanning tree for each source and
destination group by first broadcasting multicast packets to all adjacent routers. They in
turn forward the messages by flooding them selectively to all downstream interfaces.
This goes on so long as the packets reach all the members and at first this means all the
hosts in the internetwork.
The packets are forwarded using a technique called “reverse path forwarding”.
When a packet arrives to a router from some interface the router checks the source
address from that packet. Then it looks up from its unicast routing table whether the
packet came from an interface that provides the shortest path to the source. If that is
true then the packet can be forwarded to all appropriate downstream interfaces,
otherwise the packet should be discarded. This procedure ensures that if there are
routing loops in the network then the duplicate packets are removed from circulation.
This way the packets use also the correct minimum spanning tree only to reach their
destination.
When a router concludes that it has no members belonging to some multicast group
under it, it sends a prune message upstream to indicate that the branch can be removed
from the spanning tree. The pruning has a certain timeout, so after the timeout has
expired the pruned branch is added back to the spanning tree. If new member hosts
from the pruned branch join the group with IGMP join message or downstream routers
with dvrmp, the router is able to send a pruning cancellation message upstream so that
9the branch can be added back to spanning tree before the timeout expires. [dvrmp-v3,
2000]
With the regular spanning tree-pruning discontinuations DVRMP generates a lot of
broadcast like traffic. DVMRP includes also other types of messaging between routers
for distributing topology information and packet delivery optimization information. In
addition to this routers have to store large amounts of routing information. These
protocol level traffic and information storage requirements altogether lead to
performance problems when DVRMP is applied in larger networks.
2.3.2 Multicast Open Shortest Path First (MOSPF)
Multicast Open Shortest Path First (MOSPF) is also a dense mode routing protocol,
which relies on the services provided by the open shortest path first (OSPF) unicast
routing protocol. OSPF protocol uses link-state information to calculate its routes
through network. MOSPF is not actually a separate protocol but an extension to OSPF
defined in RFC 1583[RFC 1583, 1994]. MOSPF routes packages along least cost paths
where the cost is expressed as the link-state metric. DVMRP is only able to use the
number of hops as a metric whereas MOSPF can handle other kind of network
performance information as a metric; for example load balancing and quality of service
metrics are supported. [RFC 1584, 1994]
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Operation overview
MOSPF is designated to be used within one routing domain. Each router has an
identical, up-to-date routing topology of the whole autonomous system. Each router
notifies other routers of any route or topology changes with link state advertisements.
Routers flood the link state advertisements to all neighbor multicast capable routers.
Routers compute the minimum spanning trees using Dijkstra’s algorithm [Cormen et
al., 1990] and the spanning tree has to be calculated separately for each source and
destination group pair. Routers keep also list of multicast group memberships within
router’s area. In a nutshell the link-state protocols such as MOSPF operation can be
divided into three main phases:
1. Gather information about the immediate neighbor routers,
2. Gather information about all the routers in the autonomous system,
3. Calculate the minimum cost spanning trees for all source and destination pairs.
MOSPF suffers of the same performance problems as DVRMP so it does not scale
well to large networks. The periodic topology database floodings cause traffic peaks to
network and bring the performance down. And in overall the control level overhead is
way too high to make MOSPF more popular.
2.3.3 Protocol Independent Multicast
Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) is one of the newer generations of standardized
multicast routing protocols. PIM is able to work in two separate modes: dense-mode
(DM) and sparse-mode (SM). Actually these modes are two totally separate routing
protocols that do not even share any control messages, but they share the common
philosophy of independence of the underlying unicast routing protocol.
Dense-mode
As the name suggests the dense-mode protocol is designed to operate in internetworks
where multicast group members are densely located in each subnetwork. In these kinds
of environments it is sensible to use flooding techniques similar to DVRMP to deliver
the packets in network. So the packets are first sent to all downstream interfaces and
then the downstream routers send back prune–messages if there are no members
belonging to that group. The pruning is a bit problematic when several routers share a
so-called multi-access LAN; this means that the routers share the same physical wire.
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This causes problems when one router sends prune message upstream and other routers
have still group members in their downstream networks. This situation is tackled with a
pruning delay so that when the other routers hear the prune-message they still have to
cancel the prune operation. [Kosiur, 1998]
Sparse-mode
PIM-SM does not use the “flood and prune” method. PIM-SM is designed to operate in
networks where group members are sparsely distributed and that network bandwidth is
not necessarily widely available. PIM-SM does not automatically flood multicast
messages to every network but it waits for join requests from downstream routers and
after that it starts sending packets to the interface where the request arrived. This way
unnecessary packet bursts caused by flooding are absent. From security point of view it
is always better not to distribute information to the parts of network where it is not
needed.
PIM-SM uses a centralized information distribution and gathering point called
rendezvous point. Multicast service providers can register to rendezvous point to
market their service and then again multicast audience can look up from rendezvous
point what kind of services are available.
Operation overview
The joining procedure from receiver's perspective is similar to dense area protocols.
The receiver host uses IGMP join message to notify its directly attached router about
the desire to receive some multicast group's packets. The router then sends an explicit
PIM-join message towards rendezvous point. Sparse-mode routers have to keep state
information about the currently active rendezvous points so that they can send the join
request to the correct router. In case there are several routers along a multi-access wire
the router with the highest IP-address is selected as the designated router for the LAN.
Designated router is the one that forwards the PIM-join requests towards rendezvous
point. Whenever the designated router receives an IGMP message, it checks whether
the message is destined to a rendezvous point by checking the group address. When the
unicast PIM-join request travels towards rendezvous point all the routers along the way
create a forwarding entry for the group in question. And then again, when a receiver
wants to leave the group it sends an IGMP leave message to designated router and the
router forwards the PIM-prune message towards rendezvous point and possible sources.
The routers along the way remove the forwarding entry and the rendezvous point
removes the branch from spanning tree assuming that no other receivers share the same
branch. [Kosiur, 1998] [RFC 2362, 1998]
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When a source wants to send a multicast packet to some group its designated router
encapsulates the multicast packet in a PIM-SM-Register message, which is then sent to
rendezvous point. The active rendezvous point replies with a PIM-Join message and
sends it towards the source's designated router. The routers between rendezvous point
and the designated router notice the join message and create a forwarding entry for
packets coming from designated router. The designated router has to encapsulate
multicast packets into PIM-SM-Register packets until it receives a PIM-Register-Stop
message from rendezvous point. After that the multicast packets can be sent without
encapsulation. [RFC 2362, 1998]
So far we have assumed that in PIM-SM all multicast packets are circulated via
rendezvous point before actual multicasting towards receivers is performed. The
packets do not necessarily use the shortest path to receivers. Rendezvous point might
also become a bottleneck and a point of failure due to its centralised nature. To
overcome these problems PIM-SM provides means for optimising delivery tree and
balance rendezvous point's load. The receiver's dedicated router can decide based on
some metric to construct a source-based shortest path delivery tree. This can be
achieved by sending a PIM-Join message directly to the multicast source after packet
delivery through rendezvous point has started. After the shortest-path delivery tree is
working the rendezvous point rooted delivery tree can be pruned with PIM-Prune
message.
2.3.4 Core Based Trees (CBT)
Core Based Trees (CBT) is a multicast routing protocol that has very similar operation
principals to PIM-Sparse Mode. CBT uses also a shared distribution tree for multicast
packet delivery and is unicast routing protocol independent. Then again CBT does not
provide a mechanism for optimizing delivery tree to shortest-path delivery tree but the
packets have to circulate through a core point or a rendezvous point as in PIM-Sparse
Mode. Also, as the delivery trees are unidirectional in PIM-SM spanning from source or
rendezvous point to receivers, in CBT the routers keep bi-directional state information
that enables two-way communication between source and receivers. [Kosiur, 1998]
[RFC 2201, 1997]
Whereas the shared distribution tree brings scalability to the architecture, it may
also become a bottleneck, as a lot of traffic has to be routed via the rendezvous point to
the multicast group. The rendezvous point may also be farther away from some senders
than others, which may also cause annoying delay.
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3. Security concepts
3.1 History
People have used different means for hiding information from unwanted audience for
thousands of years. People have always had secrets and a lot of effort has been put
throughout centuries to the development of efficient information hiding techniques.
Especially wars have made people to produce many hiding methods for securing
strategic messaging [Kerckhoffs, 1883]. Most methods used can be classified to
cryptographical and steganographical methods. Shortly, steganography tries to hide the
existence of some message whereas cryptography uses transformations on the message
so that it cannot be understood. These two methods do not try to solve same security
problems. They are like different layers of security.
3.1.1 Steganography
Steganography (Greek: covered writing) uses such methods as invisible inks, character
arrangements, open messages, covert channels and spread-spectrum communications.
Even indians' smoke signalling can be considered to be a steganographical method. In
digital environments steganography can be used to hide additional information into
digital information formats. These include among others video and audio streams and
pictures.
A current active area of research in steganography is the usage of digital
watermarking. Digital watermarks can be used to insert virtually irremovable
"fingerprints" into copyrighted digital material. From copyright owner's and also
multicast service provider's point of view this is very useful as all the digital streams
can be stamped with the receiver's identification for example.
3.1.2 Cryptographical substitution methods
First known usage of cryptography dates back about 4000 years. Around 1900 BC in
Egypt a scribed carved hieroglyph symbols mixed with some secret symbols to
monuments to store and encode information. Similar substitution systems, where a
symbol is replaced with another, were also independently developed among other
cultures. For example Mesopotamians and Hebrews have developed substitution
systems. [Deavours et al., 1998]
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The most famous historical cryptography system is the Caesar cipher formulated by
Julius Caesar (100 – 44 BC.). In the Caesar cipher each alphabetical letter is shifted
three letters forward in alphabetical order.
Example
The Caesar cipher mapping table:
Cleartext ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
Ciphertext DEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABC
Example word:
Cleartext KEYTOUCH
Ciphertext NHBWRXFK
In one word case the Caesar cipher may seem very effective, but an experienced
cryptanalyst will find out pretty soon that the original Caesar cipher has been used. In
general substitutions where a certain alphabetic letter is replaced by another are known
as monoalphabetic substitutions. With today’s knowledge they are very easy to break
but at the time of their invention for example reading ability was not so common so
they were considered stronger.
Whereas monoalphabetic systems always produce the same ciphertext letter from a
cleartext letter and can be solved in a matter of minutes, polyalphabetic substitutions
use more clever techniques to generate different ciphertext letters from a cleartext letter.
Polyalphabetic substitutions, as the name suggests, use several different cipher alphabet
permutations to produce ciphertext output from cleartext. Many polyalphabetic
substitution systems use a two-dimensional array or a tableau as shown in Figure 5.
Plaintext
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A
C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B
D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C
E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D
F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E
G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F
H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G
I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H
J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I
K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J
L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K
M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L
N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M
O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N
P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P S
S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R
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T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S
U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T
V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U
W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V
X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W
Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X
Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y
Figure 5. Polyalphabet tableau
The table rows repeat the normal alphabet from left to right. After each complete
row the whole alphabet is shifted one letter to the left. The number of rows is
determined by the number of letters in the alphabet. One can encipher messages with
polyalphabet tableau by first selecting the cleartext letter to be enciphered from the first
row and then a certain row is selected depending on the polyalphabet system to be used.
The letter found from the coordinates designated by these two components is the
ciphertext letter.
One of the earliest known polyalphabet systems was developed by a German monk
Johannes Trittenheim and published in his six book series ‘Polygraphia’ in 1518. In his
system the cleartext column is selected as described above and the row is defined by n
mod x where x is the number of letters in the alphabet and n is the sequence number of
the cleartext letter.
Example
Here is an example word enciphered with Trittenheim’s Polyalphabet substitution
method.
Cleartext KEYTOUCH
Ciphertext LGBXTAJP
Even with this simple Trittenheim’s row selection system polyalphabet substitution
is far stronger method than monoalphabet substitution. Cryptanalyst cannot make any
kind of assumptions of the words based on letter frequencies in cipher text as cleartext
letters are mapped to different ciphertext letters each time. All in all, Trittenheim’s
ground work for polyalphabet systems laid down a base for others to develop it further.
Next logical step was to enhance the row selection method of polyalphabet systems.
In year 1563 Italian Giovanni Battista Porta (1535-1615) published a book “De furtivis
literarum” where he had documented certain Giovan Batista Belaso’s idea of shared
secret to be used in row selection. Belaso had already presented the idea in 1553, but
Porta finally analysed and documented it indepth and made some improvements.
The idea of shared secret in row selection is to use a keyword that is placed over the
cleartext and repeated as necessary as shown below with a keyword ‘salakoje’:
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Keyword: SALAKOJE SAL AKOJESALAKOJ
Cleartext: KEYTOUCH AND MULTICASTING
The keyword letter combined with cleartext letter determines the coordinates of the
enciphered letter in the polyalphabet tableau. The keyword letter over the cleartext
letter under inspection shows directly the row of the ciphertext letter.
Keyword: SALAKOJE
Cleartext: KEYTOUCH
Ciphertext: CEJTYILE
Keywords make polyalphabet substitution a strong ciphering system but not
unbreakable. It’s very important that the row selection method does not follow any
logical pattern. Even when the cryptanalyst knows that polyalphabet substitution has
been used it takes a lot of time and effort to find out the key and the cleartext if the key
has been selected wisely. The more random the key is the better.
Porta’s keyword based row selection was a clear improvement compared to
Trittenheim’s initial version but it left still room for improvement. An Italian
mathematician and physician Girolamo Cardano (1501-1576) thought that the use of
only one static key in a message could be improved with an autokeying system. In an
autokeying system the cleartext message itself is used as a keyword. Despite the fact
that Cardano introduced the concept of autokeying his autokey system had severe
design flaws so we do not present it here. The first real usable autokey system was
presented by Blaise de Vigenère (1523-1596) in 1585.
Vigenère’s autokey system uses the plain text as keying material and it has only one
letter as a static keyletter or a primary key. This keyletter and the order of the tableau’s
side alphabets are the secret pieces of information that has to be known by the sender
and the receiver. The idea is to encipher the first letter with the keyletter and after that
the first plain text letter acts as the key for the second letter and the second plain text
letter is the key for the third letter and so on. Vigenère also presented that mixed
alphabets should be used at the sides of the polyalphabet tableau to make the
predictability of the usual polyalphabet table a little harder (see Figure 6).
Plaintext
Q W E R T Y U I O P L K J H G F D S A Z X C V B N M
H C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A
N D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B
D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C
E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D
F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E
G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F
B I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G
Z J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H
J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I
K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J
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L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K
M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L
C O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M
O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N
P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
A R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P S
S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R
W U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S
U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T
V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U
T X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V
X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W
Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X
I A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y
Figure 6. Viginere's polyalphabet tableau with mixed alphabets at the sides.
Example
We use letter ‘g’ as the keyletter and table X as the ciphering tableau for our
example .
Cleartext: KEYTOUCH
Ciphertext: RMYCEUPA
One might think that when we are using only one letter as a keyletter the
cryptanalyst can easily check all the alternatives in the alphabet to decipher the
message. One recommended way to counteract this is to place nulls at the beginning of
the message or possibly encipher the message several times using different keyletters.
In any case this ciphering system was very strong at its time.
Polyalphabet substitution systems were considered too complex when they were
first introduced so they didn't gain much popularity then. People continued to use
simpler monoalphabet substitutions and they were considered efficient enough at their
time.
Cipher devices with rotor substitution
One gadget that made polyalphabet cipher a great deal easier was developed by the
famous American politician Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826). Jefferson’s device was
comprised of 26 discs and a rod. The letters of the alphabet were engraved in some
random order on the edge of each disc. The discs were threaded onto the rod in a
specified order. The device was used to encrypt cleartext in 26 letter blocks as
designated by the number of discs. The cleartext block was encrypted by first spelling
out the letters of the cleartext by rotating the discs to the cleartext block. Then another
letter line is selected as the ciphertext.
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Figure 7. Jefferson wheel cipher
Example
CLEARTEXT “KEYTOUCH PROVIDES MULTICASTING SERVICES”
Encryption of the first cleartext block (26 letters)
We select the line right above the cleartext as the ciphertext to make the example
more readable.
To decrypt the message the receiver has to have exactly an identical Jefferson wheel
device and knowledge of the line offset from the cleartext to the ciphertext. If the
cleartext message made sense the line offset was not necessarily needed as it could be
directly read after the ciphertext had been entered. Jefferson’s wheel did not need any
additional polyalphabet tableaux or
secret keywords, which made its usage easier than earlier systems. Jefferson’s wheel
was considered a very strong encryption mechanism at its time. American soldiers used
Jefferson wheel cipher for securing communication still in the First World War
although soldiers considered fiddling with the small discs as cumbersome.
The modern era of encryption machines was started by the Germans when they
developed their own rotor based polyalphabet substitution machine for securing warfare
communications [Kahn, 1967]. The machine known as the Enigma was used during the
Second World War. The Enigma was an important tool for Germans and they trusted in
its encryption power. This turned out to be a wrong assumption because as a sum of
coincidences and hard work of Polish and English mathematicians and engineers “the
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cleartext
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Figure 8. Jefferson wheel cipher
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spell of the Enigma” was broken in the late 1930s. The sloppy handling of Enigma’s
keying and training material amongst Germans helped allied forces to advance with
long leaps towards general solving method of messages encrypted with the 3 rotor
military Enigma.
Figure 9. Germany's Enigma - Rotor based substitution cipher machine
Technically speaking the Enigma itself uses consecutive, changing monoalphabet
substitutions to achieve polyalphabet substitution. The substitutions are accomplished
with mechanisms known as rotors. Rotors are like changing mapping functions where
an input letter is mapped to an output letter. The output letter of a rotor changes as the
rotor rotates according to some machine-dependent rule.
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A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
ROTOR 1 ROTOR 2 ROTOR 3
Figure 10. Enigma's example substitution diagram
We could say that the three rotor version of Enigma operates like a clock where the
letters are like seconds. The first rotor rotates one step after each letter – like seconds.
The second rotor rotates one after the first rotor has rotated a full round –like minutes.
And the third rotor rotates one step after the full round of the second rotor – like hours.
The importance of secret keys is still valid today; The enciphering system can and
should be public as long as it is mathematically complete, but the selection of the key,
its storage and exchange between communicating parties has to be kept in secrecy.
3.2 Modern times
The concern for security services in digital information environments has evolved all
the time. The need for digital information security has become more and more evident
along the development of computer networks and the whole digital information
infrastructure in general. The development race between new technologies and services
using them is setting new requirements for information security continuously.
Multicasting is one of the newer technologies that require special security
arrangements.
Although the digital technologies evolve all the time the fundamental cryptographic
goals have been the same throughout the time. Cryptography is only one way to provide
information security but we restrict our discussion only to it, as it is sufficient for our
needs regarding the multicast key management. In this section we take a brief look at
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these security concepts in cryptography and show how they are suited to digital
environments.
3.2.1 Security concepts
The main goal of cryptography is to build a framework with which the information can
be secured. The building blocks of this framework are:
Confidentiality Confidentiality provides mechanisms for keeping information
from unauthorized entities.
Data integrity Data integrity provides mechanisms for making sure that
information remains unchanged.
Authentication Authentication identifies an entity or affirms the origin of some
information.
Non-repudiation Non-repudiation prevents an entity from denying some performed
transactions.
Cryptographic framework makes use of various mathematical tools to achieve the
properties defined above. More formally these tools are known as security primitives.
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Security primitives
Unkeyed
primitives
Symmetric-key
primitives
Public-key
primitives
Arbitrary length hash
functions
One-way permutations
Random sequences
Symmetric-key ciphers
Arbitrary length hash
functions (MACs)
Signatures
Pseudorandom
sequences
Identification
primitives
Public-key ciphers
Signatures
Identification
primitives
Block ciphers
Stream ciphers
Figure 11 . Security primitives in cryptography
Some of these primitives perform overlapping functions from security point of
view, but mostly their functionality is unique to each primitive. And together when their
functionality is combined they form building blocks for information security
framework. It is the matter of information security needs to define and select the correct
security primitives to be used for each specific situation.
In this study we focus our attention mainly to symmetric-key and public-key
primitives as they are mainly used to provide digital information security with
cryptography.
Most strong cryptographical methods rely on well-known number theoretical
problems. These methods are usually public and their effectiveness does not rely on
obscurity. History has shown that we do not achieve good results with cryptographical
methods that rely on the secrecy of the method itself. The only things that have to be
kept secret are the secret keys used by these methods.
Before we can introduce security primitives we have to present a few fundamental
cryptographical concepts.
Let A  denote a finite set of alphabet of definition. The binary alphabet, where
}1,0{=A , is a commonly used alphabet.
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M denotes a set known as the message space. M consists of strings of symbols
from the alphabet of definition. In cryptography an element of M is known as plaintext.
C denotes a set called the ciphertext space. C consists of strings of symbols from an
alphabet of definition, which may differ from the alphabet of definition for M . An
element of C  is called a ciphertext.
K denotes a set called the key space. The elements of key space are known as keys.
Each element Ke∈  uniquely determines a bijection from M to C , denoted by eE .
We call eE  encryption function. To make eE  reversible the function has to be a
bijection so that we can reverse a unique plaintext from each distinct ciphertext.
For each dDKd ,∈  denotes a bijection fromC  to M . This is known as the
decryption function.
An encryption scheme consists of a set }:{ KeEe ∈  of encryption transforms and a
corresponding set }:{ KdDd ∈  of decryption transforms with the property that for each
Ke∈  there is a unique key Kd ∈  such that 1−= ed ED . This gives us mmED ed =))(( ,
for all Mm∈ . An encryption scheme is also known as cipher.
When one wants to define an encryption scheme she has to select the
transformations for encryption and decryption and also the corresponding keys
),( Ked ∈ . Note that encryption and decryption can have the some key.
With these definitions we are able to develop security building blocks somewhat
further. [Menezes, 1997]
3.2.2 Symmetric-key encryption
Symmetric key encryption is the most common encryption scheme for achieving bulk
data encryption. As the name suggests, in most cases, symmetric-key encryption uses
the same )( ed =  key for both encryption and decryption. To be more exact it can be
stated that if you know e it is computationally feasible to determine d.
Symmetric key ciphers are generally divided into two categories: block and stream
ciphers. Block ciphers are the most well-known symmetric key ciphers. Block ciphers
break up the plaintext messages into equally sized string blocks and encrypt each block
at a time. They suit well into environments where the transmission links are reliable.
Block ciphers are once more divided into subcategories: substitution ciphers,
transposition ciphers and their combinations, product ciphers. Block ciphers can be
designed to achieve very high rates of data throughput, which is the major cause to their
popularity. The efficiency is due to the fact that the symmetric key ciphers can use very
short key lengths and still gain strong encryption.
Stream cipher encrypts traffic one bit at a time. Stream ciphers are useful in
environments where transmission is error prone or buffering capabilities of the
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processing units is very limited. For example in wireless environments stream ciphers
are very practical.
The downsides of symmetric key ciphers include that the secret keys must remain
secret at both ends. Also, the management of keys becomes laborious when the number
of communicating parties becomes large, as the keys for every communicating pair
have to be renewed frequently. [Menezes, 1997]
3.2.3 Public key encryption
Public key encryption relies on the usage of one-way functions. Unlike symmetric
key ciphers public key encryption uses two different keys for achieving secrecy. The
public key is used for encrypting the message and the other key known as the secret key
is used for decrypting the message. This is very useful as we can give the public key to
anyone who wishes to communicate confidentially with the owner of the corresponding
private key. The public key combined with the public key cipher is like a one-way
function and the private key provides the reverse function when used with the cipher.
Actually public key cryptography can also be used for other purposes than
encryption. The private key can be used to generate unique hash values or signatures
from any stringified message. The signatures can then be used to prove the authenticity
and origin of the message in question.
Even though public key cryptography offers the same security services as
symmetric key encryption it cannot be used alone as public key operations are
computationally very expensive. But the forces of symmetric- and public key
cryptography can be combined to provide very efficient security services.
3.2.4 Key exchange methods
Before secure communication can begin between entities they have to be mutually
authenticated and they have to establish some shared secret, which can be used as
cryptographic keying material. This shared secret can be used as a key encryption key
(KEK) or content encryption key (CEK) for communicating parties.
The traditional solutions for establishing shared secrets are a physical meeting,
phone call, letter or any other similar way of communication. For digital environments
and especially static machines these methods are not of course suitable.
Diffie-Hellman exchange
In the 1970s Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman were focusing their research efforts
on overcoming the need for physically transporting the shared secrets from one place to
another. After several years of studying they released a paper in 1976 that introduced a
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revolutionary method for negotiating shared secrets. The paper described the first
solution for negotiating a shared secret between two communicating parties that have
not met before by exchanging cleartext messages over an open communication media.
The method known as Diffie-Hellman exchange used public key techniques for the first
time1 and its power relies on the well-known discrete logarithm problem. Finding
logarithms in a finite field is very difficult: where pgxfy x mod)( ==  is easy to
calculate, its inverse )(1 yfx −=  is not computationally feasible to find today. The
basic Diffie-Hellman does not authenticate the keys so there is a possibility for a man-
in-the-middle attack. [Black, 2000]
The basic version of the exchange can be described as follows:
Liisa generates a large prime number p and a generator g and sends them to Pauli
over an open channel. Both Liisa and Pauli choose random secrets
x, 21 −≤≤ px
and
y, 21 −≤≤ py ,
respectively, which they do not reveal to anyone, not even to each other. Then they
compute the public key values and send them to each other:
pgPauliLiisa ,:→
pgKPauliLiisa x mod: =→ (Liisa’s public key)
pgSLiisaPauli y mod: =→ (Pauli’s public key)
(Of course the first two messages could be combined so that the key is negotiated
with only two messages, but it is separated for the sake of clarity.)
After this they compute the shared secret:
)mod(mod pgpSSS yxx ==  (Liisa)
)mod(mod pgpKSS xyy ==  (Pauli) [Menezes, 1997].
SS is the shared secret number not known by anyone else than Liisa and Pauli. SS can
be used as a keying material for cryptographic algorithms for negotiating the actual
content encryption key. As this exchange does not authenticate the origin of the
exchanged messages in any way it is open for active attack. By only passively
eavesdropping the wire the hacker cannot gain any useful information that could be
used to compute the shared secret.
There are many enhanced versions of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange available
that authenticate both the keys and the origins of the messages or actually use a separate
authentication before Diffie-Hellman exchange to authenticate the exchange.
                                                          
1 In fact Ralph Merkle also discovered a public key cryptosystem at the same time, but the printing
of his paper was delayed for some reason and it was not released until 1978. Considering this fact, these
three men Diffie, Hellman and Merkle are considered to be the fathers of public key cryptography today.
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Digital signatures
Authenticated exchanges rely typically on the usage of digital signatures. Digital
signatures take once again advantage of public key cryptography. Secret keys combined
with one-way functions can be used to calculate unique hash values on any data. Hence
the counterpart public key can be publicly available in some form so that the receiver of
the message can confirm the authenticity of the data and the origin of the message.
One-way
function
00111010
01010100
Unique hash
value
Figure 12. Digital signature
4. Multicast key management
In near future the networks will have bandwidths ranging from kilobits per second to
gigabits per second. Networks will have different users and applications in
heterogeneous network environments. All these entities will have different quality of
service (QoS) and security requirements.
Secure multicast communication requires that the messages between group
members are authenticated, encrypted and integrity checked. The group members want
to be sure that their communication is not eavesdropped and that they are sure whom
they are really communicating with. The requested quality service level has to be
guaranteed even though security services are in use in the network. And when the
composition of the group is changing the group members and service providers want to
be absolutely sure that members leaving the group cannot read the messages.
4.1 Multicast group charact eristics
Canetti and Pinkas [Taxonomy, 1999] have defined properties that can be used to
quantify multicast groups based on their characteristics.
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1. Group size: Small discussion groups might have some dozens of participants
whereas virtual conferences and classes might have several thousands of
participants. And massive concert broadcasts might have several millions
participants.
2. Member characteristics: Member's computing power sets requirements for the
amount and type data to be sent. It is also important to know whether the
members are always present or is their presence occasional.
3. Membership dynamics: The group membership may be known in advance, or
the members can join whenever they want and they can leave whenever they
want. Members may be joining and leaving in bursts.
4. Expected lifetime: The group lifetime may vary depending on the type of the
group; lifetime may vary from minutes to days and even unbounded amounts of
time.
5. Amount and types of senders: Typically in broadcast type multicasts have
only one sender. Then there might be several senders. Or some senders might
generate significantly more traffic than others.
6. Volume and type of traffic: The communication may be heavy and it may
need to arrive in real time. There may be maximum allowed latency for traffic.
All these characteristics have impact on the selection of the key management
scheme, used cryptographic algorithms and needed authorisation services. Security
issues should be considered right from the beginning of system design. Service
providers should consider what are the most valuable assets and services they wants to
protect within their business and evaluate how much they should invest considering the
value of the business.
4.2 Multicast security issues
Canetti and Pinkas [Taxonomy, 1999] have also gathered security and trust related
issues that should be considered when a multicast service is designed. All the concerns
are not equally important to all types of services but their presence should be
considered when a service is designed.
Group management and access control: It should be possible to make sure that
only registered users are able to access the communication destined to the group. In
some types of services it is needed that only the members of the group are able to send
data to the group. Potential group members should be authenticated. It should be
possible to distribute security keys only to current group members. It should be possible
to revoke the membership of a leaving member. In some occasions the past
communication of the group should not be accessible to new members. The security
keys should be periodically refreshed to maintain better security.
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Ephemeral secrecy: Sometimes a mechanism that only delays access for some
amount of time may be sufficient. Or sometimes it is enough to prevent access to some
certain part of data. For example with digital media streams it may be enough to
encipher only some part of the stream to make the stream unviewable to non-group
members.
Long-term secrecy: Some services may handle information that should remain
confidential for really long time or even eternally.
Perfect forward secrecy: Even if some security keys are compromised at a later
date it should not be possible access the data encrypted with newer keys.
Sender and data authenticity: In multicast environments the authentication can
happen in two levels. First, the authentication may only need to make sure that the data
is received from some group member. Or secondly there may be a need to authenticate
the messages from each member individually.
Anonymity: In some services it may be desirable for users to stay unknown. Some
services may support the anonymity of the sender only. Then there may be applications
that need to protect the anonymity of every user of the group – careless of the role of
the group member.
4.2.1 Multicast piracy
The purpose of multicast security is to provide security services inside the multicast
group. On the other hand nothing stops some authorised users from co-operating with
some unauthorised third party to receive group messaging in cleartext. This kind of
arrangement is a common scene in the normal television-broadcasting environment. A
lot of effort has been put to fight this kind activity in the cable-TV industry, but this
problem is really very hard to overcome.
In multicast environment this kind of piracy would mainly concern one-to-many
multicast services. The only way to oppose this kind of activity is to develop effective
means for spotting piracy activities and remove the rotten members from the group.
4.3 Multicast security issues  - Example
Our example company Keytouch communications provides multicasting services where
each service requires some kind of security. We now inspect Keytouch's services more
in detail and determine which of the Canetti's and Pinka's multicast security issues
apply to each service.
PayTV is a typical one-to-many multicasting service. It sends multimedia streams
to the registered receivers, which form the multicast group itself. The members have
been registered and authenticated by Keytouch.com. Ephemeral secrecy is applied to
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multimedia streams, as we do not want any other than eligible users to view the
broadcasts.
Secure conferencing applications are a bit more complicated compared to PayTV.
The nature of conferencing application assumes that the traffic is many-to-many and
that the traffic is encrypted and authenticated. Official corporate type conferences
require that the identity of each group member be used as the basis for authentication
whereas entertainment type chat conferences may require only group level
authentication or no authentication at all. Anonymity is also a common requirement for
entertainment chat conferences.
The user of an information delivery service should always be sure that (s)he is
receiving authentic information. Also, the information should be encrypted to restrict
unauthorized access.
The polling service is conceptually and technically the most complex service
provided by Keytouch.com. Polling service must be able to identify a user and register
when (s)he has used his/her vote, but the system should not provide any hints to anyone
about what the user voted for. Yet the system should still be able to register the user's
opinion and provide information to the polling group members about the progress of the
voting.
4.4 Group key management
As multicasting optimises the usage of network links by sending one packet to the
whole multicast group instead of sending a separate packet to each recipient, it is very
natural to encrypt the multicast packets only once too. This leads us to the introduction
of the concept of the group key. A group key is a common security key that is
distributed to the whole secure group. Group key can be used to encrypt a multicast
packet and the valid multicast users are able to decrypt the packet using the group key.
The usage of group key itself is very simple, but the distribution and revocation
situations are problematic.
When a member of a multicast group leaves the group all the common group keys
have to be renewed so that the leaving member cannot receive any later messages
destined to the group. As we do not have any more secure group keys which we could
use to distribute the new group keys to each member we have to use member specific
keys or some other way to create a new group key. From performance standpoint the
key renewal operation becomes very heavy if the number of group members is very
large and only one server is responsible for doing it. To distribute new keys to every
member separately is very ineffective.
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In general we are able to identify characteristics for key distribution system that
should be considered when we are selecting or defining a key management scheme
[Moyer et al., 1999, Taxonomy, 1999].
Number of keys stored by the controller: In a simple, non-scalable scheme the
controller has to store n+1 keys for a group size n: the group key and personal security
key or Key Encryption Key (KEK) for each member. In more powerful schemes the
controller has to store more keys.
Number of keys stored by a group member: With the simple solution group
members have to store only two keys each, but the bandwidth requirements for this
solution are intolerable. In more efficient schemes the members have to store more keys
to gain bandwidth efficiency.
Join and Leave secrecy: Join secrecy assures that new members cannot read the
past messages of the group. On a join event the group key is renewed to the whole
group to ensure this. Join secrecy is typically easy to achieve as we can make use of the
old group key to distribute the new group key to the old members and to the new
member using the personal key encryption key. Leave secrecy guarantees that the
leaving members cannot read the future messages of the group. This is usually a more
resource hungry operation, as we do not have any group secret that we could use to
securely multicast new group secret to the whole group. But we still have to have some
key or other mechanism that enables controller to communicate with the valid members
securely. Poovendran et al. [Poovendran and Baras, 1999] call this property
reachability condition.
Number of messages needed to update keys on a join: Join operation is not
typically as greedy for the number of messages as the leave operation is. We may even
do some sacrifices here for the sake of a more optimised leave operation.
Number of messages needed to update keys on a leave: Leave operation with the
simple solution requires n messages to be sent by the controller. We are able to
optimise this at the cost of key storage space by subgrouping users as we will see later.
5. Comparing existing key management schemes
We now present some key distribution scheme alternatives and compare their
properties. We show first a simple centralised straightforward solution. Then we present
schemes where some of the management tasks are delegated to trusted third parties.
Then we show how hierarchical key tree can be used to make key distribution more
efficient. And finally we end our tour with a totally distributed management solution
where each member gets to contribute to the construction of the group key.
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5.1 Group key management  protocol (GKMP)
The most straightforward way to distribute keys is to use a centralized group key
controller (GC), which takes care of the group key management. Every time a member
leaves the group a new group key has to be generated and distributed to the group
members. The new group key has to be encrypted with member's personal key
encryption key (KEK). The distribution cost is linear to the group size. In addition the
controller has to store n+1 keys. Also, if the centralized controller fails it is fatal to the
whole system.
The simple key management seems tempting in its simplicity, but it cannot really be
put into any serious use. Every time a member joins or leaves we have to distribute new
group keys to every single member, as we want to protect the integrity and secrecy of
past and future messages destined to that group. For large, constantly changing groups
we definitely need sub-linear cost distribution mechanism. Large groups may produce
heavy load for the key controller, which affects its availability and ability to serve. The
fault tolerance that the simple management system cannot provide due to its centralized
nature is also vital for large groups. [GKMPA, 1997] [GKMPS, 1997]
GC
GM GM GM GM GM GM
GC   Group Controller
GM  Group Member
Figure 13. Group Key Management Protocol
5.2 Scalable multicast key d istribution (SMKD)
Key distribution mechanism becomes a bit more scalable and more fault tolerant if we
distribute authentication and encryption tasks. SMKD makes use of the multicast
distribution tree. SMKD is based on Core-Based Tree (CBT) routing protocol and it is
able to delegate encryption and authentication tasks to downstream routers. This means
that each router knows its directly attached downstream neighbours and it is authorized
to negotiate keys with new hosts and routers under it. [RFC1949, 1996]
Initially when the group is started the core router is the group controller. As routers
join the multicast delivery tree they are authorized to act as a group controller for their
directly connected subtree. [RFC1949, 1996]
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This approach is better than the GKMP from scalability perspective, but this is still
impractical when the distribution group becomes large. SMKD is also dependent on the
underlying multicast routing protocol.
CR
DR DR
GM GM GM GM
CR  Core Router
DR  Delegate Router
GM Group Member
Figure 14. Scalable multicast key distribution
5.3 Iolus
The Iolus key management scheme takes a similar scalability approach compared to
SMKD. Iolus uses secure distribution tree to link users to a single group. In practice the
multicast group is divided into subgroups. At the top level there is a Group Security
Controller (GSC), which controls the subgroup controllers known as Group Security
Intermediaries (GSIs). Both GSCs and GSIs can also be called with a common name
Group Security Agents (GSAs). [Mittra, 1997]
Each subgroup has its own security keys. Each group's GSI manages the key for the
subgroup. GSI acts as a mediator between its subgroup and other subgroups. GSI
generates key for the subgroup and takes care of the registrations to the upper level in
hierarchy. GSI also delivers messages from and to the other subgroups. [Mittra, 1997]
We take a closer look at some of the main operations involved in Iolus framework.
We inspect how the group can be initialised, how members can be added and deleted
and how the data transmission between subgroups is managed.
Initialising the group and adding members to it
When there is no members in the group there is no connection between GSIs and GSC.
When a strongly authenticated user wants to join the group it contacts a GSI and sends
a join request. The GSI generates a group key and sends it using a secure unicast
message. After that it sends a join message to the upper level GSI. This goes on as long
as the upper level GSA is GSC. When GSC is finally contacted the user becomes the
member of the group. If the GSI contacted by the user or some upper level GSI is
already a member of the group there is no need to contact upper levels and the user
becomes a member of the group.
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When a GSI contacted by the new user has already members in its subgroup the key
renewal for the whole group requires only two messages and encryptions. The new
group key for the new member is encrypted using the member's private key. The new
group key for the rest of the subgroup is encrypted using the old group key and
distributed using multicast. This kind of approach does not provide perfect forward
secrecy for the future communication, but is secure enough for most purposes. [Moyer
et al., 1999]
Deletion of a member
A member can request deletion from the group or (s)he can be thrown out for some
reason. If there are no other members in the subgroup the GSI contacts its parent and
removes itself from the distribution tree. When there are several members in the
subgroup and a member wants to leave the group key has to be renewed. As we cannot
use the old group key for renewal this requires again a linear amount of messages and
encryptions [Moyer et al., 1999].
Data transmission
Every subgroup has its own group key and no other subgroup knows it. If a member
within a subgroup sends a message to the group (s)he encrypts it with the group key and
every member including GSI in its subgroup knows how to decrypt it. GSI's job is then
to deliver the message to other subgroups by first decrypting the message with its own
subgroup's group key and then encrypt it with the upper level group's key.
For example in Figure 15 we have a part of the Keytouch.com's secure conferencing
application's distribution tree. C2 wants to send a message to the whole group. It
encrypts the message with subgroup A's key. C1,C3 and GSIA are able to decrypt the
message. GSIA then encrypts the message with subgroup B's key and sends it to the
subgroup B. GSIB does the same tricks and forwards the message to the subgroup K.
This way every GSI decrypts the message and encrypts it with the upper level's group
key and GSIs receiving messages from upper level decrypt the message and encrypt it
with its own subgroup's key. In this fashion the message gets transmitted to the whole
secure conferencing group. [Moyer et al., 1999] [Mittra, 1997]
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GSIK
GSIB GSIX
GSIA
C1 C2 C3
Figure 15. Iolus data transmission example
Iolus framework distributes wisely the workload caused by the group topology
changes to the GSIs. Even if the subgroup does not use any special distribution
mechanism for distributing keys the operations are still powerful as the groups are
typically small. The delegation of group management tasks also helps to avoid the
problems associated with centralised group management. Of course the GSC is still a
single point of failure, but when a GSI suffers from a system failure only the subgroup
in question is left without service.
The downsides of Iolus include that the group operations are very resource
intensive and the amount of group management overhead increases as the number of
GSIs grow when the group becomes larger. In addition the transmission of messages
requires decryption and encryption operations at each GSA. And as mentioned earlier
the centralized nature of GSC jeopardizes the operation of the whole group in the case
of failure.
5.4 Complementary key app roach
Complementary key scheme (CKS) optimises the key management bandwidth usage at
the cost of key storage space. CKS takes also a tree based approach where it has a root
controller which shares a separate key encryption key (KEK) with each member or leaf
i where [ ]Ni ,1∈ . Root generates the group key for the multicast communication and
distributes it separately to each leaf i encrypted with KEK(i).
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This scheme is called complementary because the root generates something known
as complementary variable for each leaf and sends them to the leafs. The root will not
send leaf's own variable, but it sends the variables of all the other members – the
complementary variables. Hence every leaf has to store N+1 variables: the KEK, N-1
complementary variables and the group key.
These complementary variables become useful when a leaf is leaving the
distribution tree. As the leaving leaf does not possess the complementary variables of
its own the others can form a new group key only by knowing the index of the leaving
member and some common deterministic way to generate the secret. Basically the root
has to only send one cleartext multicast message indicating the index of the leaving
member compared to sending a separately encrypted unicast message containing the
new group key to each leaf.
From transmission bandwidth perspective with this scheme we can gain large
savings, but as the group becomes large the (N-1) stored complementary variables can
begin to take up huge amounts of space in each leaf. Then again if several members are
being deleted from the group at the same time they may have collusion intensions. They
can exchange complementary variables to gain access to the group traffic again.
[RFC2627, 1999]
5.5 Hierarchical tree approa ch
Two separate research groups independently discovered hierarchical tree schemes. Both
Wallner et al. [RFC2627, 1999] and Wong et al. [Wong et al., 2000] noticed that when
we assign several keys per user we can find a well performing key management scheme
and balance between storage space, number of message transmissions and key
encryptions.
The keys are organised in a k-ary tree so that the internal nodes of the tree hold a
key and hence some keys are common to several users in a similar manner as in Iolus
[Mittra, 1997]. Thus, each member knows a subset of all key including a personal key
encryption key (KEK). The keys are organised so that each user knows the keys from
leaf - itself to the root, but no other keys.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
A B E F
C D
R
Figure 16. Hierarchical key tree
Wong et al. [Wong et al., 2000] have taken a formalised approach to present secure
groups. A secure group can be defined with the triple ( )RKU ,,  where:
•  U is a finite set of users,
•  K is a finite set of keys,
•  R is a binary relation between U and K, KUR ×⊂ . This is known as the user-
key relation of the secure group. User u has key k if and only if (u,k) is in R.
Messaging between principals can be described with the following notation:
A message m encrypted with key K from a to b can be written
Kmba }{:→ .
Every secure group has a key controller, which generates and distributes the keys. Key
controller is responsible for maintaining the relation R between U and K as the group
topology changes.
The relation R can be presented using key graphs [Wong et al., 2000]. A key graph
is a directed acyclic graph G where the vertices reflect the elements of Uu∈  and
Kk ∈ . The edges represent the relation R. U-vertices have only outgoing edges
whereas k-vertices may have both incoming and outgoing edges. When a k-vertex does
not have any outgoing edges it is called the root.
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C D
R
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
H J L NG I K M
Figure 17. Key graph
The key graph in Figure 17 is based on the following sets:
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Let us define two helpful functions for finding subsets in relation R:
}.),(|{)(
}),(|{)(
Rkuukuserset
Rkukukeyset
∈=
∈=
[Wong et al., 2000]
The function keyset finds the set of keys, which belong to user u in U. And the
function userset finds the users that know the key k in K.
Special categories of key graphs
The shape and size of key graph deserves special attention and next we will inspect
some specially structured key graphs to see how their attributes make a difference in
key management.
Star graph
Star key graph is a special type of secure group where each user in U has only two
keys. These are the personal KEK and the common group key. We will now illustrate
the join and leave operations using star form key graph.
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Join operation
Consider the situation shown in Figure 18. When user 8 wants to join the group
(s)he sends a join request to the key controller c. The controller authenticates the user
and grants a permission to join the group. When we are adding users to a star graph the
new user is attached directly to the root key vertex so there is no need look up a k-
vertex where to add the user. User 8 negotiates a personal KEK with c and c generates a
new group key and distributes it to the whole group. The key graph before and after join
can be seen in Figure 18 a) and b) respectively.
More formally c has to send the following messages to renew group key:
NRc }{:8)1( 2→
RRc }{:7...1)2( 2→
R
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
H J LG I K M
R2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
H J LG I K M N
a) b)
Figure 18. Star key graph join
Leave operation
Assume that in the situation of Figure 18 b), user 8 sends a leave request to the
controller C. C removes the KEK(N) and generates a new group key R. C has to
distribute new R using each user's individual KEK (G,H,I,J,K,L,M).
(1) c generates a new group key R
(2) for each member in U-{8} do
)(}{: iKEKRic → .
Star graph's bandwidth and storage requirements are identical compared to GKMP
presented earlier. Thus, star key graph is only suitable for small groups as its scalability
for larger groups is really bad due to O(n) message cost in leave operation.
Tree graph
Tree key graph is a special type of secure group in that it has only one root. The tree
graph can be parameterised with two parameters:
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•  The height h of the tree is the number of edges in the longest directed path in
the tree.
•  The degree d of the tree is the maximum number of edges of a vertex in the tree.
The values of these parameters are crucial for getting the best performance in use
from hierarchical key trees.
We will now show how join and leave operations are performed using tree key
graphs.
Join operation
Assume that in the situation of Figure 19 a), user 8 makes a join request to the
controller c. Controller c authenticates 8 and grants a permission to join the group. Then
c finds a suitable joining point k-vertex where 8 can be attached. Now c has to generate
new keys from the joining point to the root to inhibit 8 from accessing past
communication. Then c distributes securely the necessary keys to members as needed.
A B E F2
C D2
R2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
H J L NG I K M
A B E F
C D
R
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
H J LG I K M
Joining point
a) b)
Figure 19. Tree key graph join
If we look at the Figure 19 we notice that the keys in vertexes F, D and R
populating the path from joining point to the root have to be changed. C has to find the
minimum set of users for each key in order to optimise the update messaging. Wong et
al. [Wong et al., 2000] have proposed three different key distribution strategies as how
the controller should construct the rekeying messages: user-oriented rekeying, key-
oriented rekeying and group-oriented rekeying. With these strategies we are able to
achieve different kind of optimisations regarding the bandwidth usage, controller and
user processing load although one of these strategies has a superior overall
performance.
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User-oriented rekeying
In the user-oriented rekeying the controller constructs each rekeying message so that
they contain exactly all the messages that some user or a group of users need. For our
example the user-oriented messages are constructed as follows:
(1) RRc }{:}4,3,2,1{ 2→
(2) DDRc },{:}6,5{ 22→
(3) FFDRc },,{:}7{ 222→
(4) NFDRc },,{:}8{ 222→ .
Key-oriented rekeying
Key-oriented strategy emphasizes that each new key should be packed into a separate
message and distributed to the holders of the old key. For example key X is to be
replaced with a new key X'. Hence the recipients of the message can be apprehended
with userset(X). This approach excludes of course the new user of the group. The key-
oriented messages are as follows:
(1) RRc }{:}7,6,5,4,3,2,1{ 2→
(2) NRc }{:}8{ 2→
(3) DDc }{:}7,6,5{ 2→
(4) NDc }{:}8{ 2→
(5) FFc }{:}7{ 2→
(6) NFc }{:}8{ 2→ .
Group-oriented rekeying
In group-oriented rekeying strategy each new key is encrypted separately into large
messages or one large message destined to subgroups or the whole group. This means
that many users will receive large messages including keys that they do not need. This
kind of procedure still has some advantages over user-oriented and key-oriented
strategies. If we are distributing one large message to the whole group we can use
multicasting. Also, this causes a lot less messaging overhead for the controller's
rekeying messages. And the total number of transmitted bytes by the controller is a lot
less with this kind of approach. The group-oriented messages can be constructed as
follows:
(1) FDR FDRc }{,}{,}{:}7,...,1{ 222→
(2) NFDRc },,{:}8{ 222→ .
Leave operation
If the user 8 shown in the Figure 20 a) is to be deleted from the tree key graph for some
reason or another the controller c deletes first the user 8's u-vertex and the k-vertex for
the personal KEK. Then c generates and distributes the new keys as needed. All the
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keys that were known by the user 8 from the joining point to the root have to be
renewed. In the example Figure 20 b we have to renew the keys F2, D2 and R2.
A B E F
C D
R
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
H J LG I K M
a)
A B E F2
C D2
R2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
H J L NG I K M
b)
Leaving point
Figure 20.Leave from key tree graph
We will now describe the rekeying operations using the user-oriented, key-oriented and
group-oriented rekeying strategies.
User-oriented rekeying
Each user receives exactly the keys they need in a single message encrypted with some
key with which they can be reached. The server optimises the operation by finding the
minimal number of keys that are needed to encrypt the packets securely.
The messages are as follows:
(1) CRc }{:}4,3,2,1{→
(2) ERDc },{:}6,5{→
(3) MRFDc },,{:}7{→ .
Key-oriented rekeying
The principle here is also the same as in join operation: all the keys from the leaving
point F2 to the root have to be renewed. Each new key k' is sent in a separate message to
the holders given by userset(k) encrypted with the old key k. Let's consider our example
in Figure 20 a) and b) again. The following messages are sent:
(1) CRc }{:}4,3,2,1{→
(2) ED DRc }{,}{:}6,5{→
(3) MFF FDRc }{,}{,}{:}7{→ .
Group-oriented rekeying
In group-oriented leave operation we construct a single rekeying message containing all
the keys to be renewed. We try to use subgroup keys as much as possible and we
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multicast the single message to the whole group. The leave event in Figure 20 b) and a)
the message is as follows:
(1) MMEMEC FDDRRRc }{,}{,}{,}{,}{,}{:}7,6,5,4,3,2,1{→ .
We have now illustrated all the three rekeying strategies for both join and leave
operations. The common goal for all the approaches is to minimise the amount and size
of messages sent be controller to members In our examples we have had trees with
degree two, but it can be shown that the optimal degree of a key tree graph is four
[Wong et al.].
Hierarchical trees seem to be the most attractive solution for large-scale multicast
applications.
5.6 A Distributed Framework for Scalable Secure Many-to-Many Communication
(DISEC)
DISEC is a totally distributed multicast key management scheme that does not
make use of any centralized controller. It is best suited for many-to-many
communication where most of the group members are multicast sources. The main idea
in DISEC is to distribute the key management tasks and overhead evenly between
group members as opposed to many other mechanisms where the controller does most
of the work.
DISEC uses a virtual binary tree for managing key distribution. The tree consists of
virtual internal nodes and the actual member nodes as leafs. Each member generates a
secret key, which is known as the unblinded key. The blinded key is created from the
unblinded key using a one-way function, which means that it is computationally
unfeasible to try to calculate the unblinded key from the blinded one. The keys for the
internal nodes are then generated using the blinded versions of the members’ secret
keys such that a parent node's secret key is calculated from the two blinded keys of its
children with help of a mixing function. Thus all the member nodes contribute with
their key to the forming of the root key. This way each member has to generate and
know all the blinded and unblinded key on the path to the root and also all the blinded
keys of the siblings of the nodes on the path to the root. The idea of virtual binary trees
and one-way function trees where each member get to contribute to the forming of root
key was first introduced by McGrew et al in [McGrew, 1998] and has been adopted to
DISEC from there.
Each node is assigned a unique binary identifier (ID) that is used to form a key
association. The identifiers are constructed using a common variable-length binary
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coding method. The root does not have an identifier, but from there on every left child
of a node adds a ‘0’ to the parent’s identifier whereas a ‘1’ is added to form the right
child’s identifier. When a new member joins the group we can select identifier with
based on local information without the need for any centralized controller. A virtual
binary tree can be seen in the Figure 21.
R
0 1
00
000 001
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110 111
01
010 011
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100 101
0000 0001
A
E F G H I
B
C D
k00=m(k'001,k'000)
k'bh…b1  The blinded key of a node 
m   Mixing function       
k0=m(k'01,k'00)
kR=m(k'0,k'1)
kbh…b1  The unblinded key of a node 
Figure 21. A DISEC virtual binary tree with binary identifiers
The structure of the identifier has some significant properties that are used when we
are constructing the distribution key hierarchy. The identifiers can be used to track
down efficiently the member’s key association group and neighbours, as they have to
be known before we can construct all the needed keys. The key association group and
neighbours can be discovered using simple bit manipulation operation based
algorithms. The detailed algorithm description is out of the scope of this study and can
be found from Doneti’s arcticle[Doneti, 2000].
A member has to generate a key – the root key - that is common for the whole
group before it can send any secured multicast messages. Before the root key can be
constructed the member has to generate and exchange certain blinded keys with other
members of its key association group. Key association group consists of the members
that can provide the other blinded keys used with the mixing function to generate the
unblinded keys for a node.
For example in Figure 21 node C has to query blinded keys from key association
group members A, E and G and generate the unblinded keys for nodes 00 and 0 before
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it can generate the unblinded root key for node R. The blinded keys for node 00’s
mixing function are the keys of nodes 000 and 001. One blinded key for node 00 is
generated by the node C itself and the other is queried from node A. Node C sends also
the blinded key 001 to A. Node B knows also the needed blinded key, but the key
association group algorithm returns always a single member for each needed key. The
same procedure happens with node 0; C generates the blinded key for 00 and queries
the other needed blinded key 01 from member E. Then the unblinded key for 0 is
created. After that C queries the blinded key for 1 from member G and generates the
root key R.
The distributed nature of this scheme causes that each member has to exchange the
blinded keys with their own key association group members and generate and store the
unblinded and blinded keys as described above. We may of course make use of
subgroup multicasting to distribute the blinded keys more efficiently so that we do not
need to make as many unicast exchanges between members. The rekeying procedure is
initiated every time the group topology changes. We will now give short descriptions
on how the actual topology changes are handled in DISEC.
Join operation
When a user desires to become a member of a DISEC multicasting group (s)he contacts
some member of the group. The member checks the user's credentials and makes the
needed changes to the virtual tree and initiates rekeying. It is advantageous to try to
keep the tree as balanced as possible when topology changes occur. Without any
centralized controller and without any global topology information this is a bit tricky.
However in join operation the prospective user may choose to contact the member with
the shortest ID length to keep the tree balanced.
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110 111
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E F G H I
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D
J
Join request
0010 0011
Blinded and unblinded
keys known by J
Blinded keys known by J
Figure 22. DISEC join operation
In Figure 22 J has sent a join request to C. After authenticating J, C divides its
binary ID into two new ones by following the previously described guidelines: a '0' is
added to the existing parent ID for the left child C and a '1' for new right child J. Then
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both C and J generate new secret keys and exchange the blinded versions of them with
each other. The change of secret keys at the member level means that the whole key
hierarchy has to be constructed again. Altogether O(log n) unicast messages and O(log
n) multicast messages are sent during join.
Leave operation
When a member leaves the group the key hierarchy has to be partly rebuilt again - new
keys have to be agreed with the key association group and certain binary IDs have to be
assigned differently. The rekeying procedure is the same as in join, but the ID
assignment deserves some attention here. If the neighbour of the leaving member is a
sibling it assumes the binary ID of its parent. Another case is when a neighbour whose
sibling is leaving has descendants. For example in Figure 21 the member C is leaving
the group. The sibling's descendants A and B are notified and they shorten their binary
ID by one bit so that IDs become 000 for A and 001 for B. Altogether O(log n) unicast
messages and O(log n) multicast messages are sent during leave operation.
Summary
A definitive advantage of DISEC is its distributed approach for key and group
management and ID assignment. DISEC is also very scalable and it is suitable for
example for very large discussion group applications and other similar many-to-many
multicast applications. Except for the join and leave notifications there isn't any kind of
control messaging between members, which supports the distributed nature of the
scheme. This scheme is also resistant against collusion between members as the keys
are based on contributory material. Also, network or controller failures do not affect
this scheme as the group can continue communication even if some parts of network are
not functional.
5.7 Summary of the presented schemes
All the key management schemes presented in this chapter achieve the same result with
different approach. The key motivators behind these approaches are some specific type
of multicasting or even some specific application area. A gap between generations can
be clearly seen in the presented schemes: The hierarchical tree based schemes and truly
distributed one-way function tree based schemes represent the newer breed. The
foundation work has been of course done in the earlier proposals and their value cannot
be undervalued in any way.
Most of the key management schemes presented in this chapter use a centralized
controller for performing group initialisation and rekeying tasks, which makes the
controller possibly a bottleneck or a single point of failure - in theory. In practice we
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can use techniques like load balancing, clustering and replication to achieve fault
tolerant systems with high availability.
GKMP SMKD Iolus CKS HTS DISEC/OFT
Nbr of keys at the controller n+1 2 GSI
count(GSC)
n+2
1
1
−
−
k
kn -(DISEC)/2n-1(OFT)
Nbr of keys at the member 2 2 1 n+1 ndlog n2log2
Nbr of msgs for join n NA 1 n nd dlog n2log
Nbr of msgs for leave n NA Avg. nbr.
members in
subgroup
1 nd dlog log n
Theoretical single point of
failure
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Table 1. Key management schemes compared
The ultimate task of these schemes is to find a balance between number of stored keys
at each host, number of messages to be sent during joins, leaves and group
initialisations and the number of encryptions and decryptions to be performed during
keying operations. The balance between these measures evaluates the scalability of a
scheme. The schemes with logarithmic resource consumption growth are of course of
the most desirable type at this time as shown in Table 1.
Let’s take our example company Keytouch into discussion again and try to apply
some of the schemes to its services. As a commercial company Keytouch has to be able
to bill its customers hence a centralised controller based hierarchical key management
scheme would be a viable solution for all the one-to-many type entertainment services
that have to serve possibly millions of customers. For secure conferencing services we
could use the DISEC with some kind of external billing and session mechanism to take
some centralized control over conferencing. Or to simplify and unify the overall
architecture of the service we might settle for centralised hierarchical tree solution for
the conferencing applications.
6. Conclusions
In this study we have presented some mainstream proposals as how to handle key
management in multicast environment. Not all the possible approaches are presented
here but some of the alternatives that represent the current directions in this field and
some of the schemes that have laid the cornerstones for this area of research. The
research in this area has been going on for some years now and it seems that there is not
yet a clear consensus on how the keys should be distributed. The main problem area in
multicast key management is currently scalability. Several different proposals exist so
far and the ones proposing hierarchical approach for the problem seem to have the
brightest future due to their better scalability.
The multicast key management schemes presented in this study can be divided into
three categories: centralized, distributed and contributory. This distinction is not strict
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as some of the schemes fall into two different categories. For example DISEC is
definitely a distributed scheme and its keys are formed in a contributory manner by
using one-way and mixing functions. An important thing to notice is that the field of
group communication is a very broad subject and that the different applications have
varying scalability, performance, multicast type and security requirements. The
categorisation reflects the heterogeneous requirements that are present. In this light we
state that the framework for multicast applications should be open in such a way that it
can host different kind of key management schemes and future enhancements.
In this study we have only scratched one corner of the group communication
security and even multicasting security. Things like quality of service, session
authorisation, reliable multicasting and integration with standard technologies like
IPSec need also be considered. The standardisation work for multicast security issues
has just started at the IETF, which indicates that the related mechanisms begin to be
mature enough for broader audience.
Key management is one of the most critical issues in cryptographic systems. It
forms the spine for the presence of digital security.
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